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Community Heterogeneity: A Burden for
the Creation of Social Capital?n
Hilde Coffe´, Katholieke Universiteit Brussel
Benny Geys, Vrije Universiteit Brussel and Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fu¨r
Socialforschung (WZB)
Objective. This study examines the relationship between community heterogeneity
and social capital on the local government level. Method. We apply both OLS and
interval regression techniques to objective macro data of 307 Flemish municipalities
for the year 2000. Results. Our results show that, after controlling for various
socioeconomic characteristics of the municipality, income inequality is not signif-
icantly correlated with the municipality’s level of social capital. We do find a
significant negative relation between social capital and the number of nationalities
within a municipality. Yet, contrary to the prevailing argument in the literature, it is
not the presence of people with a clearly different ethnic-cultural background that
drives this negative relation. Conclusions. In accordance with previous international
findings, municipalities with large groups of differing nationalities among its cit-
izenry are confronted with a lower level of social capital. Importantly, however, our
findings emphasize the need to distinguish between different groups of nationalities
and argue for explanations beyond ‘‘simple’’ ethnic-cultural disparities.
Judging by the amount of scholarly attention (and journal space) devoted
to the concept in recent years, social capital is the ‘‘talk of the town.’’
Though the idea dates back much further, a great deal of this attention is
due to Robert Putnam’s Making Democracy Work (1993). In this influential
work, Putnam argues that the higher level of social capital in the northern
and central parts of Italy (compared to the south) allows people in these
regions to more easily overcome collective action problems. This then im-
proves the performance of the northern regional governments. The relation
between social capital and collective, societal outcomes ignited social sci-
nDirect correspondence to Hilde Coffe´, Katholieke Universiteit Brussel, Vrijheidslaan 17,
B-1081 Brussels, Belgium hhilde.coffe@kubrussel.ac.bei. The authors will share all data and
coding information with those wishing to replicate the study. They thank Didier Willaert,
Katrien Lauwerysen, and Tom Colpaert for making available their data. Previous versions of
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are grateful to Aimee Milagrosa, Liz Thomas, and the participants of the mentioned con-
ferences. They also thank Pamela Paxton, Robert Putnam, and Wendy Rahn for their val-
uable insights. The SSQ anonymous reviewers provided comments that significantly
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entists’ (though also politicians’) fascination. Indeed, a rapidly growing body
of research reports on the constructive influence of social capital for a vast
array of political, social, and economic performance measures (for a review,
see Halpern, 2005).
The positive externalities associated with the presence of social capital
naturally provoke the question of what factors promote (or block) the
emergence of this constructive force. In (partial) answer to this question,
social capital scholars recently repeatedly and forcefully—though also quite
controversially—point to the negative relation between community heter-
ogeneity and social capital (e.g., Putnam, 2005; Hallberg and Lund, 2005).
This controversy mainly centers on the argument that ethnic-cultural di-
versity is obstructive to the creation of social capital and is obviously kindled
by the fact that this relation appears to fit in nicely with the anti-immigrant
discourse of extreme right parties.1 As such, it might easily be (ab)used by
such parties to more forcefully demand the strengthening of immigration
laws and/or the reduction of immigrant rights (e.g., with respect to the
freedom of religion).
In the present article, we extend previous work on the link between social
capital and community heterogeneity in two directions. First, we analyze the
determinants of aggregate-level social capital in 307 Flemish municipalities.
This local government level has been largely overlooked in social capital
research thus far (exceptions are Rice, 2001; Coffe´ and Geys, 2005). Second,
we test the prevailing argument that ethnic-cultural diversity is a (central)
impediment to social capital formation in heterogeneous communities by
distinguishing between groups of foreigners based on their ethnic-cultural
backgrounds.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. A brief description of
the social capital concept and the correlation between community heter-
ogeneity and social capital are given in the first part. This section also
reviews prior empirical results. The next section examines whether social
capital in Flemish municipalities is related to the level of heterogeneity
within its population. The last section concludes.
Social Capital and Community Heterogeneity
The Community Heterogeneity Thesis
Despite growing academic interest, one of the prime weaknesses of the
social capital concept is the absence of consensus on how to measure it. Still,
1Moreover, as social capital reduces sympathy for and the electoral success of extreme right
parties (Billiet and De Witte, 2001; Coffe´, 2002a; Coffe´, Heyndels, and Vermeir, forth-
coming), a negative spiral may arise when ethnic-cultural diversity indeed reduces social
capital.
1054 Social Science Quarterly
most scholars recognize three core components: generalized trust, norms of
reciprocity, and networks. Social capital is therefore understood as both a
structural phenomenon (social networks) and a cultural or attitudinal phe-
nomenon (social norms and trust) (Hooghe and Stolle, 2003). Moreover,
social capital is also understood as an aggregate concept (e.g., Putnam, 1993;
Newton, 2001). It is a societal resource that links citizens to each other and
enables them to pursue their common objectives more effectively. As such, it
is argued to have a beneficial influence on various social, economic, and
political phenomena (for an overview, see Halpern, 2005). Naturally, the
next step then is to inquire into what factors promote (or block) the emer-
gence of this constructive force. Or, in other words: Which factors are
conducive for the development of social capital?
In answer to this question, the influence of community heterogeneity has
been repeatedly discussed, based on the idea that different societal environ-
ments imply varying limitations or possibilities with respect to the devel-
opment of associations, bonds of solidarity, and generalized trust (de Hart
and Dekker, 2003). Indeed, it is generally argued that the genesis of social
capital is more difficult in heterogeneous communities. This relation has
been particularly studied in terms of ethnic and income heterogeneity and
has been found both on the social and the individual level (see below).
One possible explanation for the correlation between heterogeneity and
social capital is that people have more trust and feel more comfortable
interacting with people who are similar in terms of income, race, and eth-
nicity (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000). This ar-
gument refers to the threat hypothesis, which states that in communities with
a high presence of immigrants, autochthons have more prejudices (Blalock,
1967). Additionally, members of minority groups may prefer to interact
with other minority members if they fear discrimination (Costa and Kahn,
2003). This may result in an increase of social capital within the group, but
renders the creation of mutual trust and the interaction between different
groups more difficult as a consequence of an ‘‘us versus them’’ way of
thinking (Bowles and Gintis, 2002; Knack and Keefer, 1997).
Decreasing intergroup trust may also result from a struggle over govern-
mental resources or (cultural) dominance in regions with strong, adversarial
(ethnic) relations (Stolle, 2000; Mu¨nster, forthcoming). This argument can
clearly be applied to various types of differences among groups in the pop-
ulation (e.g., with respect to race, ethnicity, income, religion, language, local
identity, etc.). For instance, the frequent struggles between the Flemish and
Walloon regions within Belgium is illustrative of the fact that similar
‘‘struggle’’ arguments may also apply to people using different languages
and/or residing in various parts of one country.
Boix and Posner (1998) furthermore suggest that income inequality
stimulates the competition over public goods. Those who have financial
resources are afraid to lose them, while envy exists among those who do not
have resources. In addition, the negative stereotypes of other groups are
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enforced by feelings of injustice in economically unequal communities,
which interferes with the creation of social capital. Another argument states
that optimism for the future makes less sense when there is more economic
inequality (Rothstein and Uslaner, 2004). People at the bottom of the
income distribution will be less sanguine that they, too, share in society’s
bounty. The distribution of resources also plays a key role in establishing the
belief that people share a common destiny and share similar fundamental
values (Rothstein and Uslaner, 2004). When resources are distributed more
equally, people are more likely to perceive a common stake with others. If
there is a strong skew in wealth, people at each end may feel that they have
little in common with others.
Finally, individuals from different socioeconomic groups are less likely to
share common values and norms. This makes it harder for citizens to ‘‘pre-
dict’’ the behavior of others (Hardin, 1993; Misztal, 1995). This uncertainty
might create an unfavorable environment for the development of generalized
trust and self-enforcing agreements.
Exploring the Empirical Literature
The association between community heterogeneity and the level of social
capital has been analyzed both at the individual (micro) and social (macro)
level. Studies on the individual level mostly use a multi-level analysis, thus
focusing both on individual and social elements to explain the individual’s
investment in social capital. Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls (1997), Ale-
sina and La Ferrara (2000), and Leigh (forthcoming a) conclude that, after
controlling for individual characteristics like age and education, social cap-
ital formation is significantly lower in heterogeneous communities. Leigh
(forthcoming b), however, concludes that when different measurements for
fractionalization (income, ethnicity, religion, and language) are included in
one model, only income inequality is significantly negatively associated with
trust. Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) find that the age fragmentation is not
significantly, though generally negatively, correlated with the level of social
capital. Interestingly, an analysis based on 1991 British census data by
McCulloch (2003) finds that (ethnic) heterogeneity is significantly nega-
tively related to social capital formation for women only (the coefficient for
men is also negative, though statistically insignificant).
Costa and Kahn (2003) do not use a multi-level analysis, but restrict their
model to contextual variables. They conclude that volunteering, member-
ship, and trust among 25- to 54-year-olds are lower in heterogeneous com-
munities, particularly those in which wage inequality is high.
Experimental research by Glaeser et al. (2000) confirms the above-men-
tioned conclusions. Specifically, they look at the importance of ethnic di-
versity in the formation of social capital through two-person trust games.
They find that participants from different races or nationalities behave in a
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less trustworthy manner toward one another and conclude that the degree of
social connection predicts the level of trust and trustworthiness between two
individuals. This implies that racial diversity within groups restricts trust in
others and the reliability of someone’s behavior toward others.
Studies on the aggregate level have focused strongly on analyses at the
country level. Two of these regard only the effect of income inequality.
Rothstein and Stolle (2001) and Rothstein and Uslaner (2004) both show
that income inequality is strongly negatively correlated with generalized
trust. The higher the income inequality, the lower the level of trust. Three
other studies have a slightly broader aim. Knack and Keefer’s (1997) com-
parative analysis of 29 countries based on the World Values Study points
out that income inequality and ethnic heterogeneity are strongly correlated
with less trust and less social involvement. A study of 40 countries by La
Porta et al. (1997) finds a similar negative relation between ethnolinguistic
heterogeneity and social capital. Delhey and Newton (2005), in a compar-
ative study on social trust in 60 countries, confirm these results. Interesting
in their results is that ethnic homogeneity seems to have a direct effect on
trust as well as an indirect effect via the consequences of ethnic homogeneity
on good governance, welfare, and income equality.
Finally, at a lower level of aggregation, Hero (1998, 2003a, 2003b)
regards the relation between Putnam’s (1993) index of social capital and
racial inequality in 48 American states. The results indicate that there is a
strong and negative association between racial heterogeneity and the level
of social capital in the state. Rice and Steele (2001) find that Iowa towns
with high levels of white ethnic diversity tend to have a lower level of
community attachment and that the populations of these towns view




In line with, among others, Putnam (1993, 2000) and Newton (2001),
we understand social capital as an aggregate concept and thus operationalize
it as a characteristic of communities rather than individuals. We thereby rely
exclusively on aggregate-level data. The alternative strategy, that is, using
individual-level survey data that are aggregated to the municipality level,
cannot be used given the absence of survey-based data at the municipal
level in Flanders. Specifically, we include three different (aggregate-
level) indicators to measure the level of social capital in the Flemish
municipalities.
2This section draws heavily on Coffe´ and Geys (2005).
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Our first indicator of social capital measures associational life. Voluntary
associations are seen as creators of social capital because of their socialization
effects on democratic and cooperative values and norms. Moreover, the trust
and norms of reciprocity that people generate in associations are spread over
the whole community, encompassing citizens who are not equally active in
associational life (Stolle, 2000). We use the number of a wide variety of
organizations (per capita) in each municipality to measure the density of
associational activity (Lauwerysen and Colpaert, 2004; Bloso, 2004). Along
with sports clubs, this measure also includes the number of sociocultural
associations within a municipality. These sociocultural associations are pri-
marily local branches of (inter)national associations for, among others,
women, retired people, and civil rights movements.3 Our measurement of
sociocultural associations includes both bonding and bridging associations
(Putnam, 2000). Some organizations are inward looking and encompass
people with the same (e.g., ethnic or religious) background.4 Other net-
works are outward looking and bring citizens into contact with people from
a cross-section of society. A dense network of sports and sociocultural or-
ganizations refers to a high level of social capital.
In correspondence with Putnam (2000), Costa and Kahn (2003), and
Casey (2004), we use electoral turnout in the 2000 municipal elections as a
second indicator of social capital. This is measured as the number of votes
cast on Election Day (valid as well as invalid) divided by the number of
registered voters. It refers to civic involvement and participation in public
affairs. Importantly, voting is compulsory in Belgium. Still, this compulsory
character is to a large extent ‘‘symbolic’’ as penalization is virtually non-
existent in practise.5 Moreover, turn-out rates ranged from 87.95 percent to
98.46 percent in the election under study and thus show significant variation
between the Flemish municipalities. This lack of prosecution and the sig-
nificant variation in actual turn-out rates allows us to interpret high turn-out
levels as signaling an engagement toward the ‘‘common good’’ (and thus a
3We lack data on informal contacts people may have. Still, though loose and amorphous
networks of individuals might also facilitate civic attitudes and behaviors, the broadening of
the social capital concept to include various types of social interaction might constitute a
conceptual problem as it becomes fuzzier and its relationship to performance less obvious
(Stolle, 2003). Besides, Stolle (1998) argues that informal socializing is not particularly
conducive to social capital.
4Some voluntary associations are explicitly related to religious or political groups. Such
verzuiling (pillarization) involves that these organizations will particularly attract people with
certain religious and political characteristics. As such, they might be more important for
bonding than for bridging. Still, their explicit link with a particular confessional group does
not imply that these associations do not appeal to people with different socioeconomic
backgrounds (implying they would allow for bridging across social groups). In fact, research
has indicated that traditional pillar associations are more successful in attracting lower-
educated people than the new social movements whose members are predominantly highly
educated (Coffe´, 2002b). Besides, they have been particularly active in trying to attract ethnic
minority groups within their organizations (Billiet, 1993).
5Following the 2000 municipal elections, nonvoters were sued in two of the 27 Belgian
judicial areas. In all, 391 of the 628,957 nonvoters were prosecuted (Geys, 2004).
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high level of social capital).6 The extent of associational life and electoral
turnout are indicators that cover the structural component of social capital.
Putnam (1993), Fukuyama (1995), and Inglehart (1997) suggest that
social norms, but in particular trust among citizens, establish the cultural
aspects of social capital. As Delhey and Newton (2005) show that distrust
accompanies conflict, the crime rate can be conceived as an indicator for the
level of generalized trust within a municipality and thus as an objective
proxy for the attitudinal (or cultural) component of social capital. Hence,
and thereby following Rice and Sumberg (1997), the crime rate per capita in
each municipality is used as our third indicator of social capital. Clearly, as
crime in societies will lower citizens’ respect and trust in one another, low
crime rates are expected to be indicative of a high level of social capital.
These three indicators are expected to measure a similar underlying con-
cept (i.e., social capital). Hence, we combine them into a single index using
principle component analysis (PCA).7 This mitigates the influence of id-
iosyncratic measurement error within each of the variables and maximizes
the likelihood of measuring the underlying concept more precisely. Thus,
even though the individual indicators are arguably less than ideal and their
choice might be criticized, the component retrieved from the PCA analysis
‘‘probably measures social capital better than any single indicator’’
(Bjrnskov, 2003:7; see also Rice and Sumberg, 1997; Knack, 2002). The
results of the PCA are summarized in Table 1.
It is clear from Table 1 that each element loads powerfully onto one
underlying component extracted from the data. Note also that with the use of
all three indicators into one principal component, our index of social capital
comprises both structural aspects (i.e., associational life and political involve-
ment) and a cultural aspect (i.e., the crime rate as a proxy for trust). Hence,
our social capital index takes account of the dual nature of the concept.8
6Empirical evidence shows that competition is a core determinant of voter turnout in two-
party settings such as the United States and the United Kingdom (see, e.g., Geys, forth-
coming). However, in multi-party settings, such as the Flemish municipalities, the meas-
urement of ‘‘competitiveness’’ or ‘‘closeness’’ is not straightforward. Nonetheless, Geys and
Heyndels (forthcoming) recently used the ‘‘size inequalities’’ between the parties competing
in Flemish municipal elections as a proxy for electoral competition. The results indicate that
these size inequalities do not exert a statistically significant influence on voter participation.
As such, the effect of competition on voter turnout in Flemish municipalities is likely to be
insignificant and therefore does not affect the suitability of this variable for our analysis.
7A preliminary analysis indicates that our data are suitable for PCA. Specifically, the
Keiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy is above the critical 0.50 level
(KMO5 0.55) and the Bartlett test of sphericity significantly rejects the null hypothesis
that the intercorrelation matrix comes from a population in which the variables are non-
collinear (chi2 (3)5 100.89). This implies that our three indicators are strongly correlated.
8By merging structural and cultural aspects of social capital into one index, we follow the main
strand of the literature arguing that the different components of social capital have a systematic
interrelationship with one another and are thus part of a joined-up concept. We should note,
however, that some authors indicate a need for caution about constructing social capital indices
that mix indicators of social connectedness with indicators of generalized trust and reciprocity
(see Knack and Keefer, 1997; Newton, 1999; Knack, 2002). They argue that all the indicators
should be kept apart and the relations between them treated as a matter of investigation.
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Measuring Community Heterogeneity
We measure community heterogeneity through income inequality and
diversity in nationalities. Income inequality is measured by the fraction of
the interquartile difference in income and the median income level in the
municipality: [(Q3Q1)/Median]. This quantifies how strongly income
levels are dispersed about the median level. Income inequality varies from
about 70 to little over 130 (indicating that the difference between the
income level at the first and third quartile equals 70–130 percent of the
median income level in the municipality). Higher values for the index point
to higher levels of income inequality.
The diversity in nationalities is measured by the ‘‘effective’’ number of
nationalities in the population, which is the inverse of the Herfindahl-




i with pi equal to the share of
nationality i and n equal to 21 (indicative of the 21 most frequent nation-
alities in Belgium). We include only 21 nationalities due to data availability.
Indeed, for the period relevant for this study (i.e., prior to 2001) the National
Institute for Statistics (NIS) provides data ‘‘only’’ for these 21 nationalities.
These are: Belgian, German, Danish, French, English, Luxemburg, Dutch,
Irish, Italian, Greek, Spanish, Portuguese, Swiss, Polish, Turkish, Algerian,
Moroccan, Tunisian, Zairean, American, and Japanese. Admittedly, most of
these groups have at best a minor representation and their inclusion probably
does not make a substantive difference for the ‘‘effective’’ number of na-
tionalities. Still, for the sake of completeness, we included all 21 nationalities
in our empirical analysis. In 2000, the largest groups of foreigners were
Dutch (ca. 75,000), Moroccan (ca. 42,000), Turkish (ca. 35,000), Italian
(ca. 25,000), and French (ca. 17,000). Higher values for the index point to
higher levels of community heterogeneity in terms of nationalities. Note that
the ‘‘effective’’ number of nationalities is fairly small in most municipalities
due to the predominance of people with the Belgian nationality in Flemish
municipalities. Yet, despite this dominance of Belgian inhabitants, there is a
significant amount of variation across the municipalities, which can be used
as an explanatory factor in the empirical analysis.
TABLE1
The Social Capital Component
Component Measure Component Loading
Electoral turnout 0.84
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Bivariate correlation coefficients indicate—in line with previous research
(see above)—that there is a negative relation between community hetero-
geneity and social capital. Both income inequality and the number of na-
tionalities are significantly negatively connected to social capital (r5  0.16
and r5  0.30, respectively).
Empirical Model
Though supportive of findings in the previous international literature,
these bivariate results should be regarded as only a first examination of the
data. When estimating the effect of community heterogeneity on social
capital, it is imperative to control for the possible importance of rival ex-
planations. Hence, in the present section, we estimate a multivariate re-
gression model including, besides our two central variables of community
heterogeneity, a number of socioeconomic control variables. More specif-
ically, we estimate the following empirical model for 307 Flemish munic-
ipalities (where subscript i stands for the municipalities and Social capitali
refers to the level of social capital as described in Table 1):9
Social capitali ¼ a þ b1 Incomei þ b2 Educationi þ b3 Unemploymenti
þ b4 Agei þ b5 Population sizeiðlnÞ
þ b6 Density of populationi
þ b7 In - and outward migrationi þ b8 Homeownershipi
þ b9 Income inequalityi þ b10 Number of nationalitiesi
þ ei:
First, we control for four sociodemographic elements that have proven to be
important determinants of social capital at the individual level. Though the
theoretical foundation for a relation of these variables to social capital at the
aggregate level is (at the very least) imperfect, we feel that not controlling for
their effects in our analysis may yield inconsistent estimates due to omitted
variable bias. As such, we include per-capita taxable income (in 1,000 Euro)
and the level of education within a community. The latter is measured by the
percentage of the population (older than 20 years) with a college or uni-
versity degree. A third sociodemographic control variable is the unemploy-
ment rate. It is defined as the percentage of the total municipal population
that is unemployed. The fourth and final sociodemographic variable in-
cluded in the model is the share of elderly (over age 65) within a community.
Second, we control for the effects of four contextual variables. To control
for the anonymity and alienation that are characteristic of large cities (Wirth,
1938; Weber, 1947) and the fact that a large population tends to weaken the
force of ethical rules (Buchanan, 1965), we include population size and the
9Missing data prevent the inclusion of the small municipality Herstappe.
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density of the population. Population size equals the number of inhabitants
in the municipality (the natural logarithm controls for the highly skewed
distribution of this variable). Population density is measured by the number
of inhabitants per square kilometer. Additionally, we control for the res-
idential stability of the population by means of the in- and outward mi-
gration in the municipality during one year as a percentage of the total
population. We expect mobility to reduce social capital as ‘‘leaving a com-
munity tends to destroy established bonds, thus depriving family and chil-
dren of a major source of social capital’’ (Portes, 1998:11; see also Bowles
and Gintis, 2002). In line with this, we also add the extent of homeown-
ership. Ownership of a house does not only imply that one is likely to stay
longer in a region, but also entails a financial investment in a certain en-
vironment (Green and White, 1997; DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1999). As the
quality of the (social) environment influences housing prices, homeowner-
ship creates an additional incentive to invest in social capital. Homeown-
ership is measured by the percentage of houses with a known resident that
are occupied by the owner.
Empirical Results
The results are given in Table 2. Before we discuss the findings, it is
important to point out two methodological issues. First, we employ two
different estimation techniques. Columns 1, 3, and 5 present the results
using simple OLS. However, this technique does not control for the limited
range of values that our dependent variable takes. This could lead to biased
estimation results and incorrect inferences. To accommodate this issue, in
Columns 2, 4, and 6, we report results using an ‘‘interval’’ regression tech-
nique where we impose that the dependent variable is limited to a given
interval. Mathematically, this is equivalent to performing a Tobit estimation
while imposing both a top and bottom boundary to the estimation. It is
clear from Table 2 that the results from both estimations are very similar.
The results of our basic model, as specified above, are presented in Columns
1 and 2, while Columns 3–6 show further elaborations (see below).
Second, the direction of causality is ambiguous for most of the variables
included in the model. For example, one could argue that higher education
levels lead to higher investment in social capital (Verba, Lehman, and Brady,
1995), but it has also been shown that social capital has a positive effect on
school results (La Porta et al., 1997). To minimize the problems associated
with this reverse causality, we operationalize each of our explanatory var-
iables one year prior to the measurement of social capital (i.e., using data
from 1999).10 The reason is that historical municipal characteristics may
10The sole exceptions to this rule are the level of education and homeownership. For these
variables, we use data from 2001 and 1991, respectively (due to availability).
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well be used to explain the current level of social capital, while that level of
social capital is less appealing as an explanation for historical characteristics
of the local population. Since the variation of our variables is relatively small
in time, such a time lag obviously does not solve all problems of causality.
Hence, we refrain from statements about the causality of the effects and talk
instead about a (mutual) correlation.11
The results of our multivariate analysis reveal that there is no effect of
economic diversity on social capital. The significant bivariate finding thus
appears to derive from the other socioeconomic determinants that are con-
trolled for in the regression equation. This lack of correlation is in contrast
to previous findings at the individual (Costa and Kahn, 2003; Leigh, forth-
coming a, forthcoming b) and the aggregate level (Knack and Keefer, 1997).
This could indicate that income diversity across the Flemish municipalities
is too limited to generate (substantively and statistically) significant effects.
Indeed, relative to income inequality across countries (Knack and Keefer,
1997), the differences among Flemish municipalities are rather low. Another
possible explanation is that the Flemish population cares little about income
differences within their community when deciding whether to invest in
social capital.
In contrast to the results for income inequality, ethnic heterogeneity has a
significant depressing effect on social capital even after controlling for the
influence of various socioeconomic control variables. When the effective
number of nationalities within a municipality increases, the level of social
capital, ceteris paribus, decreases.12 This result is in line with findings from
previous research at the macro level using data across countries or American
states (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Hero, 1998, 2003a, 2003b). The creation
of groups and the formation of bonds of trust and reciprocity thus appear to
be less problematic in communities where people share a common nation-
ality.13
However, the results may be influenced by the geographical position of
the municipalities. After all, communities that lie close to a country border
are characterized by a large presence of non-Belgians. Additionally, these
11We repeated the analysis with data from two and three years prior to the determination
of social capital and achieved similar results. Also, the use of historical data as instruments for
the present values of the explanatory variables (through 2SLS) leaves the general tenor of the
results unaffected (results available on request).
12Inclusion of dummy variables for four of the five Flemish provinces as a proxy for
historical-geographical effects does not affect this result. These dummies indicate that—all
else being equal—social capital is significantly lower in the Province of Antwerp, while none
of the other provinces differ statistically significantly from one another.
13When the analysis is repeated for the different components of social capital separately, we
find that the effective number of nationalities is significantly (on the 5 percent level) and
negatively correlated with electoral turnout and the number of associations within a mu-
nicipality. Income inequality is significantly (on the 10 percent level) and negatively related
to electoral turnout. Heterogeneity in terms of income and nationalities is not significantly
correlated with the level of crime.
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border communities are often confronted with so-called border crime.14 The
existence of both phenomena may lead to a bias in our results. Yet, the results
presented in Columns 3 and 4 indicate that even after controlling for the
location of the municipality at a country border (operationalized as a dummy
with value 1 for the border municipalities and 0 for the other communities),
the number of nationalities within a community is negatively correlated with
the level of social capital. Even though the relation becomes slightly weaker,
it remains significant at the 5 percent level of significance. Note that our
analysis also indicates that the location of a municipality alongside a country
border is negatively associated with the level of social capital.
The negative relation between heterogeneity and social capital has in the
literature often been explained by ethnic prejudices and ethnic-cultural dif-
ferences between various groups in the population (see above). To assess
whether these ethnic-cultural explanations can be confirmed in our research,
we distinguish the three most important groups of non-Belgians in Columns
5 and 6: west Europeans (the Netherlands, France, Germany, Denmark, the
United Kingdom, Luxemburg, Ireland, and Switzerland), south Europeans
(Italy, Spain, Greece, and Portugal), and people from Turkey and the Ma-
ghreb countries (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia). The distinction between
these different groups is based on the finding that the autochthons perceive
the presence of various groups of immigrants in a different way. Specifically,
native Belgians consider the presence of south European immigrants as less
conspicuous and less problematic than the presence of immigrants from
Islamic countries (Meuleman and Billiet, 2003). Moroccans and Turks, for
instance, are generally less accepted as neighbors or colleagues and this may
thus preclude ‘‘bridging’’ social capital formation.
Interestingly, our analysis shows that only the percentage of inhabitants of
west European origin is significantly negatively related to the level of social
capital. The larger their proportion is in the population, the lower the level
of social capital. The percentage of south Europeans is positively but not
significantly associated with social capital, while the percentage of immi-
grants from the Maghreb countries and Turkey is negatively but also in-
significantly related to the level of social capital.15 Hence, the negative link
between diversity in terms of nationalities and social capital does not appear
to derive from ethnic and cultural differences. Indeed, the ethnic and cul-
tural differences with people from the Maghreb countries or Turkey are
considerably larger than those with west or south Europeans. They differ
14Although such criminal acts are committed by inhabitants from a neighboring country,
spill-over effects might exist through which the general level of trust of the municipality’s
inhabitants (and thus the level of social capital in that municipality) is influenced.
15These findings do not result from potential multicollinearity problems. In fact, the
correlations between the shares of the various groups of nationalities in the municipal pop-
ulation are weak, with the exception of the relation between the share of south Europeans and
the share of people from Turkey and the Maghreb countries (r5 0.53). Moreover, running
the regressions using each of the groups separately does not affect our results.
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most with regard to religion, habits, lifestyle, appearance, and costume.
Relying on the phenomenon of multiculturality to explain the negative re-
lation between social capital and community diversity may thus be mis-
guided. This corresponds with the analysis of Rice and Steele (2001), which
shows that Iowa towns with high levels of white ethnic diversity tend to have
a low level of community attachment. Moreover, the residents of these
towns view their communities with more suspicion and tend to be less
involved in community activities.
Switching to the socioeconomic control variables, we observe that lower
levels of average income are associated with higher levels of social capital.
This corresponds to Oliver’s (1999) finding that relatively rich neighbor-
hoods tend to have lower participation rates. However, research at the in-
dividual level has provided evidence that high-income individuals have
higher levels of social capital (Delhey and Newton, 2005; Leigh, forthcom-
ing a, forthcoming b). This illustrates once more that individual-level find-
ings cannot just be translated to the aggregate level, or vice versa. A similar
conclusion holds for the lack of effect from unemployment and education.
Whereas individual-level research generally shows a strong relation with
social capital (e.g., Hooghe, 2003), our analysis on the social level does not
provide evidence of such a relationship.
The share of elderly (over age 65) in the population has a significant
negative effect on a municipality’s level of social capital. This contrasts with
Putnam’s (2000) conclusion that older people tend to have a higher level of
social capital. He points to the change in generation to explain this effect
and the effect of experiencing World War II at a relatively young age on the
social sentiments of the ‘‘long civic generation.’’ Our findings are more in
line with the conclusions from individual-level research in Flanders by
Breda, Schoenmaekers, and van Geel (2003). They find that the elderly in
Flanders are more often subject to feelings of insecurity and social exclusion.
Population size as well as population concentration are negatively associated
with the level of social capital in the municipality, indicating that trust and
norms of reciprocity tend to be easier to maintain in smaller municipalities.
Finally, we find that the residential stability of the population has an important
effect on social capital. Both the negative effect of in- and outward migration in
the municipality and the positive effect of homeownership indicate that re-
siding in a community for longer periods of time increases involvement in the
community (and thereby social capital). Also, given that both effects are sta-
tistically significant, the ownership of a house creates an additional incentive to
invest in social capital (due to one’s financial investment in the community).
Conclusion and Discussion
The concept of social capital has in recent years obtained considerable
attention from both the scientific and political world. This is largely a
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consequence of the rapidly increasing number of findings in the scientific
literature that social capital has a supporting effect on various social phe-
nomena such as economic and institutional performance. Such findings
naturally trigger the question of what factors promote (or block) the emer-
gence of this constructive force and in what social contexts it grows most
expeditiously. Indeed, different societal environments imply varying limi-
tations or possibilities with respect to the development of associations, bonds
of solidarity, and generalized trust (de Hart and Dekker, 2003). In the
present article, we concentrated on one aspect of this social context, namely,
the heterogeneity of the population. Previous studies found that community
heterogeneity has an important influence on the creation of social capital
across countries (Stolle, 2000; Knack and Keefer, 1997) and American states
(Hero, 1998, 2003a, 2003b). Studies of this effect at the local level have,
however, been rare. This article takes a first step to bridge this gap.
Our results illustrate that, after controlling for various relevant socioe-
conomic contextual variables, social capital in Flemish municipalities is not
significantly related to the level of income inequality. However, we do
find—as suggested by previous analyses—that more extensive diversity in
terms of nationalities within the community is significantly and negatively
associated with social capital. Yet, this association, contrary to what has been
suggested in the literature, cannot be directly attributed to ethnic-cultural
differences. Indeed, our results show that the presence of people with a
distinguishably different ethnic-cultural background (i.e., people from Tur-
key or the Maghreb countries) is not significantly negatively correlated with
the level of social capital. Rather than the extent to which we differ from one
another, it appears to be the presence of a difference (in nationality) that
plays a crucial role (see also Rice and Steele, 2001).
This is a somewhat surprising result, especially given the fact that the
presence of (west and) south European immigrants is often seen as less
problematic than that of those from Islamic countries (Meuleman and
Billiet, 2003). As a possible explanation, one could speculate that the (often
presumed) higher investment in ‘‘bonding’’ social capital by people from
Turkey or the Maghreb countries (or even southern Europe) compensates
for their lack of ‘‘bridging’’ social capital, whereas this may not be the case
for west European immigrants (whose lesser distance from ‘‘home’’ may
thwart investments even in ‘‘bonding’’ social capital). This, however, is a
very tentative explanation that calls for more extensive research. The ob-
served pattern may also derive from the high number of European citizens
that reside in Belgium to work at one of the EU institutions. Being mostly
temporary residents, their lower incentive to invest in social bonds may
reduce social capital, especially in those areas where EU staff is predom-
inantly located (thereby also reducing social capital especially in areas with
many European foreigners).16 Still, as the effects we find are not significantly
16We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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stronger in the province of Vlaams Brabant, which envelops the Brussels
region (where most EU staff can be expected to live), this can at best be a
partial explanation for our results. Finally, given the limited timeframe of
the present analysis, it was impossible to assess any temporal developments
that may influence the observed relation between social capital and socio-
economic heterogeneity. In future research, it would clearly be of interest to
incorporate these dynamic processes.
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